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 Abstract: The present discussion concerning certain fundamental physical theories 
(such as string theory and multiverse cosmology) has reopened the demarcation 
problem between science and non-science. While parts of the physics community 
see the situation as a beginning epistemic shift in what defines science, others deny 
that the traditional criterion of empirical testability can or should be changed. As 
demonstrated by the history of physics, it is not the first time that drastic revisions 
of theory assessment have been proposed. Although historical reflection has little to 
offer modern physicists in a technical sense, it does offer a broader and more 
nuanced perspective on the present debate. This paper suggests that history of 
science is of some indirect value to modern physicists and philosophers dealing 
with string theory, multiverse scenarios, and related theoretical ideas. 
 
The recent debate about fundamental physical theories with no or little connection to 
experiment and observation concerns primarily the relationship between theoretical 
physics and philosophy. There are reasons to believe that a more enlightened 
perspective on the debate can be obtained by taking into regard also the history of 
physics and history of science generally. Possibly unknown to many physicists, there 
are several historical precedents, cases which are somewhat analogous to the present 
one and from which much can be learned. Apart from outlining what I consider to be 
the essence of the current debate, this paper briefly discusses the general role that 
history of science can play in science and philosophy of science. It refers to some 
noteworthy lessons from past physics, of which one particular case, namely the 
nineteenth-century vortex theory of matter, is singled out as a possible analogue to 
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the methodological situation in string physics. While I do not suggest that these 
earlier cases are substantially similar to the ones concerning string theory and the 
multiverse, I do suggest that there are sufficient similarities on the level of 
methodology and rhetoric to make them relevant for modern physicists and 
philosophers. 
 
1. The very meaning of science 
In May 2008 there appeared in New Scientist an article with the provocative question 
“Do we need to change the definition of science?” Six years later Nature included an 
appeal to “Defend the integrity of physics” (Matthews, 2008; Ellis & Silk, 2014). Both 
articles discussed essentially the same question, namely whether or not certain recent 
developments in theoretical physics belong to science proper. For more than a 
decade there has been an ongoing and often heated dispute in the physics 
community, and also in some corners of the philosophical community, concerning 
the scientific status of theories such as superstring physics and multiverse 
hypotheses. These theories are cultivated by a fairly large number of professional 
physicists and are thus, by ordinary sociological standards, undoubtedly to be 
counted as scientific. But are they also scientific from an epistemic point of view or 
does their status as branches of physics require an extension or revision of the 
traditional meaning of science?  
 The classical demarcation problem between science and non-science (which 
may or may not include pseudoscience) has taken a new turn with the appearance of 
fundamental and highly mathematical theories which may not be experimentally 
testable in the ordinary sense. So why believe in them? According to the philosopher 
Dudley Shapere (2000, pp. 159-61), “physics is in fact approaching, or perhaps has 
reached, the stage where we can proceed without the need to subject our further 
theories to empirical test.” He asks, “Could empirical enquiry, which has guided up 
to a certain point science in its history, lead at that point to a new stage wherein 
empiricism itself is transcended, outgrown, at least in a particular domain?” There 
are more than a few physicists who would presently respond affirmatively to 
Shapere’s question. It should be noted that the demarcation problem and the 
traditional criteria of falsifiability and empirical testability are not only discussed by 
physicists but also in some other branches of science. For example, biologists have 
questioned these criteria and suggested, in striking analogy to the debate concerning 
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multiverse physics, that methodological norms of what constitutes good science are 
not only irrelevant but also detrimental to the progress of their science (Yang, 2008). 
 What it is all about can be summarized in the notion of “epistemic shifts,” 
meaning claims that the basic methodological and epistemological rules of science 
are in need of revision (Kragh, 2011). These rules may be appropriate for most 
science and have been appropriate for all science until recently; but in some areas of 
modern physics they are no longer adequate and should therefore be replaced by 
other norms for the evaluation of theories. A proposed shift in epistemic standards 
may be of such a drastic nature that it challenges the very meaning of science as 
traditionally understood. In this case it effectively implies a new demarcation line 
separating what counts as science and what does not. This is what Steven Weinberg 
(2007) alluded to when he, referring to the string-based multiverse, said that “we 
may be at a new turning point, a radical change in what we accept as a legitimate 
foundation for a physical theory.” 
 Another way of illustrating the notion of an epistemic shift is to compare it to 
Thomas Kuhn’s idea of revolutions separated by different paradigms. Richard 
Dawid (2013, p. 124) speaks of the debate in the physics community as “a paradigm 
shift regarding the understanding of scientific theory assessment.” According to the 
original version of Kuhn’s philosophy of science paradigm shifts include different 
criteria for what counts as acceptable science and also for evaluating theories. Rival 
paradigms carry with them rival conceptions of science and for this reason alone they 
are incommensurable. In principle, no rational argument can decide whether one 
paradigm is superior to a competing paradigm. The rhetoric of epistemic shifts has 
become part of modern physics. “We are in the middle of a remarkable paradigm 
shift in particle physics,” asserts one physicist, referring to the anthropic string 
landscape (Schellekens, 2008). And according to another physicist, the multiverse 
promises “a deep change of paradigm that revolutionizes our understanding of 
nature” (Barrau, 2007). 
 The purpose of this paper is not to re-examine the recent debate concerning 
string theory and multiverse cosmology but rather to look at it through the sharp 
lenses of history of science. Although knowledge of the history of the physical 
sciences is of no direct relevance to the ongoing debate, it is of some indirect 
relevance. It may serve the purpose of correcting various mistakes and to place the 
subject in a broader historical perspective. Physicists may think that superstrings and 
the multiverse have ushered in a uniquely new situation in the history of science, but 
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if so they are mistaken. There have been several cases in the past of a somewhat 
similar nature if not of quite the same scale. I modestly suggest that modern 
fundamental physics can in some sense learn from its past. Before turning to this past 
I shall briefly review what is generally and for good reasons considered the most 
important of the traditional standards of theory evaluation, namely that a theory 
must be testable.  
 
2. Testability 
To speak of the “definition” of science is problematic. There simply is no trustworthy 
methodological formulation which encapsulates in a few sentences the essence of 
science and is valid across all periods and all disciplines. Nonetheless, there are some 
criteria of science and theory choice which are relatively stable, enjoy general 
acceptance, and have been agreed upon since the early days of the scientific 
revolution (Kuhn, 1977). Almost all scientists subscribe to the belief that testability is 
more than just a desideratum that scientists have happened to agree upon and which 
suited science at a certain stage of development. They consider it a sine qua non for a 
theory being scientific that it must be possible to derive from it certain consequences 
that can be proved right or false by means of observation or experiment. If there are 
no such consequences, the theory does not belong to the domain of science. In other 
words, although empirical testability is not a sufficient criterion for a theory being 
scientific, it is a necessary one.  
 Einstein was a great believer in rationalism and mathematical simplicity and 
yet he was convinced that “Experience alone can decide on truth” (Einstein, 1950, p. 
17). He is followed by the large majority of modern physicists who often go to great 
lengths in order to argue that their theories, however speculative and mathematical 
they may appear to be, do connect with empirical reality. Lee Smolin (2004, p. 70) 
echoed Einstein when he concluded about the opposing views of string theory and 
loop quantum gravity that, “Because this is science, in the end experiment will 
decide.” 
 Physicists working with string theory, multiverse cosmology or related areas 
of fundamental physics are routinely accused of disregarding empirical testability 
and to replace this criterion with mathematical arguments. The accusations are not 
quite fair (Johansson & Matsubaru, 2009; Dawid, 2013, p. 154). By far most physicists 
in these fields readily accept the importance of testability, admitting that empirical 
5 
 
means of assessment have a higher epistemic status than non-empirical means. On 
the other hand, they stress the value of the latter methods which sometimes may be 
the only ones available. At the same time they maintain that their theories have – or 
in the near future will have – consequences that at least indirectly can be tested 
experimentally. They have not really abandoned the commonly accepted view of 
experiment as the final arbiter of physical theory. “The acid test of a theory comes 
when it is confronted with experiments,” two string theorists say (Burgess & 
Quevedo, 2007, p. 33). Unfortunately the necessary experiments are in most cases 
unrealistic for the time being, but what matters to them is that predictions from the 
theories are not beyond empirical testability in principle.  
 Although one can identify a consensus view concerning testability, it is to 
some extent rhetorical and of limited practical consequence. One thing is to agree 
that theories of physics must be testable, but another thing is the meaning of the 
concept of testability, where there is no corresponding consensus. Everyone agree 
that actual and present testability, involving present instrument technologies or those 
of a foreseeable future, is preferable, but that is where the agreement ends. Some of 
the questions that physicists and philosophers have discussed are the following. 
(1) Should it be required that a theory is actually testable, or will testability in principle, 
for example in the form of a thought experiment, suffice?  
(2) Should a theory result in precise and directly testable predictions, or will indirect 
testability do? 
(3) If a theory does not result in precise predictions, but only in probability distributions, 
is it then testable in the proper sense? 
(4) Will a real test have to be empirical, by comparing consequences of the theory with 
experiments or observations, or do mathematical consistency checks also count as 
tests? 
(5) Another kind of non-empirical testing is by way of thought experiments or 
arguments of the reductio ad absurdum type. A theoretical model may lead to 
consequences that are either contradictory or so bizarre that they are judged 
unacceptable. How should such arguments enter the overall evaluation picture? 
(6) At what time in the development of a theory or research programme can one 
reasonably demand testability? Even if a theory is not testable at present, in a future 
version it may result in testable predictions. 
(7) How should testability be weighed in relation to other epistemic desiderata? For 
example, is an easily testable theory with a poor explanatory record to be preferred 
over a non-testable theory with great explanatory power? What if the testable theory 
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is overly complicated and the non-testable one is mathematically unique and a 
paragon of simplicity? 
(8) Should predictions of novel phenomena be counted as more important than pre- or 
retrodictions of already known phenomena? 
I shall not comment further on these issues except pointing out that some of them 
are particularly relevant with regard to theories, such as string theory or 
multiverse scenarios that are not actually testable in the ordinary way. Indirect 
testability (#2) may mean that if a fundamental and well-established background 
theory with great empirical success results in a prediction which cannot be tested 
directly, then the success of the background theory functions as an indirect test. 
The existence of multiple universes can in this sense be said to be tested by 
quantum mechanics as a background theory. “Accepting quantum mechanics to 
be universally true means that you should also believe in parallel universes,” says 
Max Tegmark (2007, p. 23).  
 With respect to #4 there are indeed physicists who have appealed to 
mathematical consistency as a kind of test of string theories. If admitted as a test it 
is part of what Dawid (2013) calls non-empirical theory assessment. On the other 
hand, the issues ##6, 7 and 8 are of a general nature and relevant to all scientific 
theories whether modern or old. They can be easily illustrated by means of 
concrete cases from the history of science, but this is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
 
3. Physics, philosophy, and history 
The fundamental question of the demarcation between science and non-science is 
of a philosophical and not of a scientific nature. It rests on certain standards and 
criteria that nature herself does not provide us with and therefore cannot be 
determined by purely scientific means. The standards and criteria do not need to 
be part of a philosophical system or even to be explicitly formulated, but they 
nevertheless belong to the realm of philosophical discourse. The borderline 
between physics and philosophy has shifted over time, typically with physics 
appropriating areas which were traditionally considered subjects of philosophical 
speculation. At least, this is how some physicists like to see the historical 
development. They question if there is any need for external norms of science of a 
philosophical nature, suggesting that such norms are unnecessary and may even 
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be harmful to the progress of science. Only the scientists themselves can decide 
what the boundary is between science and non-science.  
 According to Barrau (2007), “If scientists need to change the borders of their 
own field of research it would be hard to justify a philosophical prescription 
preventing them from doing so.” Susskind (2006) agrees, adding that “Good 
scientific methodology is not an abstract set of rules dictated by philosophers.” 
However, the question of what constitutes a legitimate scientific theory cannot be 
left entirely to the scientists. The seductive claim that science is what scientists do 
is circular; moreover, it presupposes that all scientists have the same ideas of 
what constitutes science. But if there were such a methodological consensus in the 
physics community there would be no controversy concerning the scientific 
legitimacy of research areas such as superstrings and the multiverse. History of 
science strongly suggests that certain methodological prescriptions, such as 
testability of theories, are almost universally accepted; but it also shows that in 
some cases the consensus breaks down. The current discussion about string 
theory and the multiverse is evidently such a case. 
 In so far that philosophical ideas about science are intended to relate to real 
science (and not to be purely normative) they must agree with or at least confront 
the large pool of data provided by the history of science. This is particularly 
important for philosophical views concerning the dynamics of science or the 
development of science in its temporal dimension. Consider a philosophical rule 
which has the consequence that the change from the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantum 
theory to the new quantum mechanics in the mid-1920s was not progressive. 
Such a rule is simply not credible.  
 It may be tempting to consider the history of science as providing an 
empirical data base for the testing of philosophical theories about science, in 
somewhat the same way that experiments and observations function as tests of 
scientific theories. However, this is problematic for several reasons (Schickore, 
2011). Foremost among these reasons is that historical case studies exhibit a great 
deal of variation over time, discipline, and culture. They deal with a particular 
case at a particular time, with the result that the methodological lessons one can 
draw from two important cases in the history of science are rarely the same. 
Philosophers, on the other hand, aim at saying something general about science 
and its development. 
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 There have been several attempts among philosophers of science to extract 
rules of scientific development from the history of science or to formulate rules 
strongly guided by history. None of them have been very successful. Larry 
Laudan (1977, p. 160) suggested that “our intuitions about historical cases can 
function as decisive touchstones for appraising and evaluating different models 
of rationality, since we may say that it is a necessary condition of rationality that 
it squares with (at least some of) our intuitions.” Laudan’s standard intuitions 
included that after 1840 it was irrational to believe that light consisted of particles 
and similarly, after 1920, that the chemical atoms had no parts. Such examples are 
however rather trivial and of no real use. The interesting cases in history and 
philosophy of science are precisely those about which there are no standard 
intuitions of rationality. Was it rational to believe in the late 1820s in the 
corpuscular theory of light or, in 1900, in the non-composite atom? 
 A more recent and more ambitious research project on the testing of theory 
dynamics included sixteen historical case studies ranging from the Copernican 
revolution in astronomy to the electroweak unification in particle physics 
(Donovan, Laudan & Laudan, 1988). These cases were compared with 
philosophical rules such as “the appraisal of a theory depends on its ability to 
solve problems it was not invented to solve” and “the standards for assessing 
theories do not generally vary from one paradigm to another.” Although the 
project resulted in interesting analyses, it failed in establishing a non-trivial 
philosophical methodology on the basis of history of science. Among its obvious 
weaknesses was that the project rested on a rather arbitrary selection of case 
studies; had other cases been chosen the result would have been different.  
 The failure of the mentioned approach to philosophy of science does not 
imply that philosophers can or should avoid engaging in historical studies. 
Indeed, if philosophers want to retain contact with real science and how it 
changes in time they must take history of science seriously; they must investigate 
real science in either its present or past forms. By far most of our knowledge of 
how science has developed comes from the past and is solidly documented in the 
historical sources. History of science is an indispensable but also, by its very 
nature, an incomplete guide to understanding contemporary science. By 
investigating cases from the past and relating them to cases from the present, 
philosophers as well as active scientists may obtain a broader and more 
enlightened view of current science.  
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 Historical arguments and analogies have a legitimate albeit limited function 
in the evaluation of current science. Even a physicist with no interest in or 
knowledge of the history of his or her field of research cannot avoid being guided 
by the past. In science as in other areas of human activity it would be silly to 
disregard the historical record when thinking about the present and the future. 
On the other hand, such guidance should be based on historical insight and not, 
as is often the case, on arbitrary selections from a folk version of history. 
Generally speaking, the history of science is so diverse and so complex that it is 
very difficult to draw from it lessons of operational value for modern science.  
 In a paper of 1956 the brilliant and controversial astrophysicist Thomas Gold, 
one of the fathers of the steady state theory of the universe, argued that 
cosmology was a branch of physics, hence a science. But he dismissed the idea of 
a methodology particular to physics or to the sciences generally. “In no subject is 
there a rule, compliance with which will lead to new knowledge or better 
understanding,” Gold (1956) wrote. “Skilful observations, ingenious ideas, 
cunning tricks, daring suggestions, laborious calculations, all these may be 
required to advance a subject. Occasionally the conventional approach in a 
subject has to be studiously followed; on other occasions it has to be ruthlessly 
disregarded.” Undoubtedly with the ongoing controversy between the steady 
state theory and relativistic evolution cosmology in mind, Gold further reflected 
on the lessons of history of science with regard to the methods of science. But he 
considered history to be an unreliable and even treacherous guide: 
Analogies drawn from the history of science are frequently claimed to be a guide [to 
progress] in science; but as with forecasting the next game of roulette, the existence 
of the best analogy to the present is no guide whatever to the future. The most 
valuable lesson to be learned from the history of scientific progress is how 
misleading and strangling such analogies have been, and how success has come to 
those who ignored them. 
Gold’s cynical and anarchistic view is not without merit, but it seriously 
underestimates the power of history and the value of insight based on the history 
of science. Although the development of history of science is not governed by law 
or exhibits much regularity, neither is it an accidental series of events comparable 
to a game of roulette. 
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4. Some lessons from past physics 
As mentioned, empirical testability is an almost universally accepted criterion of 
science. But even with respect to this most sacred of the defining features of 
science we find in the history of science a few exceptions. It is after all not a 
necessary ingredient of science. Dawid (2013, p. 97) argues that the role played by 
non-empirical theory assessment in modern fundamental physics is a 
continuation of earlier tendencies to be found in post-World War II particle 
physics. This is undoubtedly correct – think of the development of S-matrix or 
“bootstrap” theory in the 1950s and 1960s – but in my view there is no reason to 
restrict the historical perspective to the era of quantum and relativity physics. 
There are inspiration and instruction to be found also in other and earlier 
examples from the history of physics. 
 During the early decades of the nineteenth century Romantic natural 
philosophy (known as Naturphilosophie) made a great impact on physics and the 
other sciences in Northern Europe (Cunningham & Jardine, 1990; Kragh, 2011, pp. 
26-34). In this grand attempt to revolutionize science and base it on an entirely 
new foundation, speculations and aesthetic sentiments were not only considered 
legitimate parts of science; they were necessary parts and even more fundamental 
than empirical investigations. The philosopher Friedrich Schelling, the spiritual 
leader of the Naturphilosophie movement, even founded a Journal of Speculative 
Physics as a means of promoting and communicating the new science. At the time 
the term “speculation” did not have the pejorative meaning it typically has today 
but was largely synonymous with “intuition.” It was a fundamental assumption 
of the new speculative physics that mind and nature co-existed as a unity, such 
that one was unable to exist without the other. 
 Schelling and those who followed his thinking were not necessarily against 
experiments, but they thought that measuring the properties of objects and 
phenomena was of no great importance since it provided no understanding of the 
inner working of nature. In some cases natural philosophers went so far as to 
completely deny that observation and experiment could lead to any real insights 
into nature’s secrets. The sort of nature that could be empirically investigated was 
regarded as a dull wrapping that contained and obscured the real, non-objective 
nature. The only way to recognize the latter was by taking the route of 
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speculative physics, namely, guided by the intuitive mind of the genius. The laws 
of nature were thought to coincide with the laws of reason; they were true a priori 
and for this reason it made no sense to test them by means of experiment.  
 Before dismissing Romantic natural philosophy as nothing but 
pseudoscientific and metaphysical nonsense it should be recalled that some of the 
greatest physicists of the time were much influenced by the movement. Examples 
include H. C. Ørsted and Michael Faraday, the two celebrated founders of 
electromagnetism. Another example is Johann Ritter, the discoverer of ultraviolet 
radiation. Nonetheless, one cannot conclude from the case that good physics can 
flourish in the absence of experimental testing of theories. Neither Ørsted, 
Faraday, nor Ritter subscribed to Schelling’s more extreme ideas and especially 
not to his disrespect of experiment. Ørsted’s belief in a unity of electric and 
magnetic forces was rooted in the Romantic philosophy, but it was only when he 
verified it experimentally in 1820 that he turned it into a scientific discovery.    
 More than a century later we meet a very different version of rationalistic 
physics in the context of “cosmophysics,” an ambitious attempt to formulate a 
complete and final theory of the universe and all what is in it. The leading 
cosmophysicists of the 1930s were two of Britain’s most reputed scientists, Arthur 
Eddington and E. Arthur Milne. Although their world systems were quite 
different, they had in common that they aimed at reconstructing the very 
foundation of physics; they did so by basing physics on a priori principles from 
which the laws of nature could be uniquely deduced by pure reason. 
Experimental tests played but an insignificant role, being subordinated logical 
and mathematical arguments. Milne seriously believed that when his system of 
world physics (as he called it) was completed there would be no contingent 
elements at all in the laws of nature; it would then turn out that the laws were no 
more arbitrary than the theorems of geometry. A mathematician knows whether a 
theorem is true or not without consulting nature. Likewise, Milne (1948, p. 10) 
wrote that “it is sufficient that the structure [of world physics] is self-consistent 
and free from contradiction.” 
 Eddington’s idiosyncratic fundamental theory promised a way to deduce 
unambiguously all the laws and constants of nature from epistemic and 
mathematical considerations. In his bold attempt to unify cosmology and the 
quantum world, mathematics played a role no less elevated than in Milne’s 
theory (Eddington, 1936, p. 3; Durham, 2006; Kragh, 2017): 
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It should be possible to judge whether the mathematical treatment and solutions are 
correct, without turning up the answer in the book of nature. My task is to show 
that our theoretical resources are sufficient and our methods powerful enough to 
calculate [of nature] the constants exactly – so that the observational test will be the 
same kind of perfunctory verification that we apply to theorems in geometry. 
Of course, neither Milne nor Eddington could afford the luxury of disregarding 
experiments altogether. But they argued that experiments did not reveal the true 
laws of nature and consequently could not be used to test the laws. Eddington 
famously calculated the precise values of many of the constants of nature such as 
the fine-structure constant, the proton-to-electron mass ratio, and the 
cosmological constant. When experiments failed to agree with the predicted 
values he arrogantly maintained that the theory was correct; any discrepancy 
between theory and experiment must lie with the latter.  
 The theories of Milne, Eddington and their few followers shared the same 
fate as the revolutionary Romantic natural philosophers: they were unproductive 
mistakes and are today relegated to the long list of grand failures in the history of 
science. All the same they are of some relevance in so far that aspects of the same 
aspirations and rationalist methods can still be found in modern physics. The 
most extreme version is probably the Platonic “mathematical universe 
hypothesis” proposed by Max Tegmark (2014), but also in the history of string 
theory there are examples which show at least some similarity to the earlier ideas 
of cosmophysics. Referring to the theory of superstrings, John Schwarz (1998) 
wrote, “I believe that we have found the unique mathematical structure that 
consistently combines quantum mechanics and general relativity. So it must 
almost certainly be correct.” Unfortunately the prediction of supersymmetric 
particles remained unverified, but this did not worry Schwarz too much: “For this 
reason, even though I do expect supersymmetry to be found, I would not 
abandon this theory if supersymmetry turns out to be absent.” 
 Without going into further detail I think one can conclude from the history of 
physics that fundamental theories, in order to be successful from a physical (and 
not merely mathematical) point of view, must have some connection to empirical 
reality. The historical record of such theories suggests that empirical testability is 
a necessary condition for progress. But this is as far as the historical argument can 
go. Because one can observe some regularity in the past – say that all physically 
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progressive theories have been actually testable – there is no guarantee that the 
regularity will continue in the future. 
 Many of the arguments in string theory and multiverse physics rely 
implicitly on two philosophical principles which can be traced back to Leibniz in 
the late seventeenth century. One is the doctrine of a pre-established harmony 
between the mathematical and physical sciences, making pure mathematics the 
royal road to progress and unification in physics (Kragh, 2015). The other is the 
principle of plenitude which essentially states that whatever is conceived as 
possible must also possess physical reality. The plenitude principle is a 
metaphysical claim that translates potential existence into real existence. In its 
more modern formulation it is often taken to mean that theoretical entities exist in 
nature in so far that they are consistent with the fundamental laws of physics. 
Since numerous other universes than ours are consistent with the equations of 
string theory they must presumably exist (Susskind, 2006, p. 268).  
 The ontological plenitude principle has played a most important role in the 
history of science and ideas, including modern theoretical physics from Dirac’s 
positron to Higgs’s boson. Although in many cases it has been dramatically 
fruitful, it cannot be justified by reference to its historical record. For every 
example of success, there is one of failure. If the former are better known than the 
latter it is because history is written by the victors. In this case as in many others, 
history of science is ambiguous. It does not speak unequivocally in favour of 
either the principle of plenitude or a pre-established relationship between 
mathematics and physics; nor does it speak unequivocally against the doctrines. 
 
5. A Victorian analogy to string theory? 
Yet another case from the past deserves mention, namely the vortex theory of 
atoms which attracted much scientific attention during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. In particular from a methodological point of view, but not of 
course substantially, there is more than a little similarity between this long 
forgotten theory and the string theory of contemporary physics. Based on a 
hydrodynamic theory of vortices proposed by Hermann von Helmholtz, in 1867 
William Thomson (the later Lord Kelvin) argued that atoms and all atomic 
phenomena might be understood in terms of permanent vortex rings and 
filaments moving in a continuous, all-pervading medium or “fluid.” The medium 
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was generally identified with the commonly assumed world ether, meaning that 
the discrete atoms were reduced to particular states of motion in the continuous 
ether. Dualism was replaced by monism. For details about the history of the 
vortex theory, see Kragh (2002) which includes references to the sources of the 
quotations in this section. 
 For about two decades the research programme initiated by Thomson was 
vigorously cultivated by a minor army of mostly British physicists and 
mathematicians. Although the mathematically complex theory did not easily lead 
to results that could be compared to experiments, the vortex physicists stressed 
that it was empirically useful and, at least in principle, testable in the ordinary 
sense. Indeed, it was applied to a wide range of physical and chemical 
phenomena, including spectroscopy, the behaviour of gases, chemical bonds, the 
periodic system of the elements, and even gravitation. Considered a truly 
fundamental theory, ultimately it was expected to provide a physical explanation 
of the riddle of gravity. Thomson’s collaborator Peter Tait went even further. 
“The theory of vortex-atoms must be rejected at once if it can be shown to be 
incapable of explaining this grand law of nature,” he wrote in 1876. In spite of 
many attempts to derive gravity from the properties of vortex atoms, no 
explanation came forward. On the other hand, neither was it conclusively shown 
that the theory could not account for Newton’s law of gravitation. After all, lack 
of verification is not falsification. Proponents of the theory suggested 
optimistically that, when the theory was developed into still more advanced 
versions it would eventually solve the problem.  
 Despite the vortex theory’s connection to a variety of physical and chemical 
phenomena, its empirical record was far from impressive. And yet, although 
quantitative verification was missing there were just enough suggestive 
qualitative agreements to keep the theory alive as more than just a mathematical 
research programme. A characteristically vague defence of the vortex theory was 
offered by the American physicist Silas Holman: “The theory has not yet, it is 
true, been found capable of satisfactorily accounting for several important classes 
of phenomena, … but this constitutes no disproof. The theory must be judged by 
what it has accomplished, not by what we have not yet succeeded in doing with 
it.”  
 What justified the vortex theory and made it so attractive, was not so much 
its ability to explain and predict physical phenomena as it were its 
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methodological and aesthetic virtues. Albert Michelson believed that the vortex 
theory “ought to be true even if it is not;” and Oliver Lodge similarly described it 
as “a theory about which one may almost dare to say that it deserves to be true.” 
It was also these virtues – the theory’s purity and lack of arbitrary hypotheses – 
which greatly appealed to Maxwell. “When the vortex atom is once set in motion, 
all its properties are absolutely fixed and determined by the laws of motion of the 
primitive fluid, which are fully expressed in the fundamental equations,” he 
wrote in 1875. “The method by which the motion of this fluid is to be traced is 
pure mathematical analysis. The difficulties of the method are enormous, but the 
glory of surmounting them would be unique.”  
 Mathematics played a most essential role in how the vortex theory was 
developed and perceived. In fact, a large part of the development was driven by 
interest in pure mathematics and quite unrelated to physical phenomena. Papers 
on the subject appeared equally in journals devoted to mathematics and physics. 
In his 1867 paper Thomson pointed out that the calculation of the vibration 
frequencies of a vortex atom presented “an intensely interesting problem of pure 
mathematics.” To his mind and to the minds of many other vortex theorists, the 
difficulties of deducing observable phenomena from the vortex theory were a 
challenge rather than an obstacle. The difficulties only added to the appeal of the 
theory.  
 The hope that progress would come through mathematics was a persistent 
theme in the history of the theory. It was routinely argued that it was not yet 
understood sufficiently to be physically useful. According to Tait, theoretical 
investigations of the kind that related to real phenomena would “employ perhaps 
the lifetimes for the next two or three generations of the best mathematicians in 
Europe.” Although this was a formidable difficulty, there was no reason for 
despair. Because, “it is the only one which seems for the moment to attach to the 
development of this extremely beautiful speculation; and it is the business of 
mathematicians to get over difficulties of this kind.” 
 The reliance on mathematics was a mantra among the advocates of the 
vortex theory of matter and ether. Here is yet another expression of the mantra, 
this time from the British physicist Donald Mcalister: 
The work of deduction is so difficult and intricate that it will be long before the 
resources of the theory are exhausted. The mathematician in working it out acquires 
the feeling that, although there are still some facts like gravitation and inertia to be 
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explained by it, the still unexamined consequences may well include these facts and 
others still unknown. As Maxwell used to say, it already explains more than any 
other theory, and that is enough to recommend it. The vortex-theory is still in its 
infancy. We must give it a little time. 
Although the term “theory of everything” did not exist at the time of the vortex 
theory (it seems to date from 1985), this is what the theory aimed to be. As late as 
1895 – just a few years before the arrival of quantum theory – the mathematical 
physicist William Hicks discussed the vortex theory as far the best candidate for 
what he called an ultimate theory of pure science. The aim of such a theory, he 
said, was “to explain the most complicated phenomena of nature as flowing by 
the fewest possible laws from the simplest fundamental data.” Science, he went 
on, “will have reached its highest goal when it shall have reduced ultimate laws 
to one or two, the necessity of which lies outside the sphere of our cognition.” 
When the laws had been found, “all physical phenomena will be a branch of pure 
mathematics.” Hicks believed that the vortex theory was at least a preliminary 
version of the ultimate theory, a complete version of which would require even 
more mathematical investigation. “It is at present a subject in which the 
mathematicians must lead the attack.” 
 The mathematical richness of the vortex theory might be considered a 
blessing, since it effectively protected the theory from being falsified, but it was 
also a curse. It made G. F. FitzGerald exclaim that “it seems almost impossible but 
that an explanation of the properties of the universe will be found in this 
conception.” The final vortex theory that he and others dreamt of could in 
principle explain everything, including the properties of the one and only 
universe. But could it also explain why the numerous other conceivable states of 
the universe, all of them consistent with the theory’s framework, did not exist? 
Could it explain why the speed of light has the value it has rather than some 
other value? The theory could in principle explain the spectral lines and the 
atomic weight of chlorine, but had chlorine had any other spectrum and other 
atomic weight the theory could account for that as well. In short, the ratio 
between the theory’s explanatory and predictive force was embarrassingly large. 
 Let me end with one more quotation: “I feel that we are so close with vortex 
theory that – in my moments of greatest optimism – I imagine that any day, the 
final form of the theory might drop out of the sky and land in someone’s lap. But 
more realistically, I feel that we are now in the process of constructing a much 
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deeper theory of anything we have had before and that … when I am too old to 
have any useful thoughts on the subject, younger physicists will have to decide 
whether we have in fact found the final theory!” The quotation is not from a 
Victorian physicist in the late nineteenth century but from an interview Edward 
Witten gave in the late twentieth century. The only change I have made is to 
substitute “vortex” for “string” in the first sentence. It is probably unnecessary to 
elaborate on the methodological and rhetorical similarities of the vortex theory of 
the past and the string theory of the present. 
 I find the case of the vortex theory to be instructive because it exhibits on a 
meta-level some of the features that are met in much later fundamental theories of 
physics. Among these are the seductive power of mathematics and the no less 
seductive dream of a final theory. It illustrates that some of the general problems 
of contemporary physics are not specifically the result of the attempts to unify 
quantum mechanics and general relativity. But the dissimilarities are no less 
distinct than the similarities. For example, string theory is cultivated on a much 
larger scale than the vortex theory, which largely remained a British specialty. 
Another difference is the ideological and religious use of the vortex theory in 
Victorian Britain, where it was customary to see the initial vortical motion in the 
ether as a result of God’s hand. As Thomson pointed out in his 1867 address, 
vortex atoms could only have come into existence through “an act of creative 
power.” As far as I know, the religious dimension is wholly absent from string 
theory (but not always from multiverse cosmology). 
 
6. Conclusion   
The primary function of history of science is to describe and understand past 
science irrespective of whether or not it connects with the modern development. 
It is not to assist or guide contemporary science, a function for which historians of 
science are generally as unfit as philosophers are. There is no reason to believe 
that modern string theorists would perform better if they were well acquainted 
with earlier episodes in the history of physics. While this is undoubtedly true in a 
technical sense, historical reflection has something to offer in a broader sense, 
namely when it comes to the general understanding of the present debate about 
fundamental physics. In my view, what can be learned from the past relates 
mostly to the philosophical aspects of the debate, to the novelty of the epistemic 
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situation, and to the rhetoric used in the presentation of modern fundamental 
physics to a general public.  
 By adopting a historical perspective it becomes clear that many of the claims 
concerning the uniqueness of the present situation are exaggerated. It is not the 
first time in history that scientists have seriously questioned the traditional norms 
of science and proposed revisions of what should pass as theory assessment. 
Apart from the precedents mentioned here, there are several other cases of 
intended epistemic shifts (Kragh, 2011). Physics may presently be at “a turning 
point” or “a remarkable paradigm shift,” but if so it is not for the first time. 
Knowledge of the history of science and the history of fundamental physics in 
particular, cannot but result in an improved and more balanced picture of what is 
currently taking place in areas such as string theory and multiverse cosmology. 
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